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INTRODUCTION
The world is subject to continuous change. Ideas and practices,
which were once revolutionary, become outmoded and archaic as society responds to new events, developments, and knowledge. This
change places great stress on the American constitutional order and
its institutions. To encourage stability and the rule of law, constitutional decisions made by courts are often characterized as permanent. However, that treatment of the results of constitutional litigation produces tension because the factual conditions on which such
results are based may fade away as time passes.
The tension between an ever-changing world and a stable constitutional order is particularly prevalent when a court assesses a classification under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
1
Amendment. In this situation, a court must evaluate the facts establishing the government’s asserted interest and the facts demonstrat2
ing that the classification furthers the government’s interest.
Here, a question arises: Should the court examine only those factual conditions that existed at the time of the classification’s creation,
or should its analysis be informed by the changed factual conditions
that may exist at the time of the constitutional challenge? Proper
analysis under the Equal Protection Clause must be conducted in
*
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Thanks to Professor Kermit Roosevelt III for serving as my advisor on this Comment.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (stating that, under strict scrutiny, “classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental interests”); Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992) (stating that, under rational basis review, “the Equal Protection Clause requires only that the classification
rationally further a legitimate state interest”); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)
(stating that, under intermediate scrutiny, “classifications . . . must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives”).
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light of the factual conditions that exist at the time of the constitutional challenge, rather than looking back to the classification’s creation. This Comment refers to that assessment of the present factual
conditions as “contemporary contextual analysis.”
When reviewing equal protection challenges under strict scrutiny,
the United States Supreme Court uses contemporary contextual anal3
ysis consistently. However, contemporary contextual analysis is not
confined to the most exacting form of review. Each level of scrutiny
requires that a classification be connected to its context, though the
strength of that connection may vary.
But lower courts have questioned whether contemporary contextual analysis is appropriate at the least-probing level of scrutiny—
4
rational basis review. Those courts argue that contemporary contextual analysis overburdens legislative bodies, forcing them to be per5
petual monitors of their laws. Such arguments shirk the judicial role
and threaten the legitimacy of both courts and legislatures. Rational
basis review, while more deferent, demands an examination of the
present factual context, just like strict or intermediate scrutiny.
Part I discusses the conventional view that the results of constitutional adjudications should be permanent and attempts to reconcile
it with contemporary contextual analysis. Part II provides an in-depth
discussion of contemporary contextual analysis under the Equal Protection Clause and advocates for its use at every level of scrutiny. Part
II.A provides an overview of contemporary contextual analysis. It discusses contemporary contextual analysis as a logical component of
3

4

5

See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341–43 (stating that the constitutional permissibility of raceconscious admissions policies in higher education may change over time); United States
v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 (1938) (“[T]he constitutionality of a statute
predicated upon the existence of a particular state of facts may be challenged by showing
to the court that those facts have ceased to exist.”).
Burlington N. R.R. v. Dep’t of Pub. Serv. Regulation, 763 F.2d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 1985)
(“The Supreme Court has been ambivalent on whether changed circumstances can transform a once-rational statute into an irrational law.”); Murillo v. Bambrick, 681 F.2d 898,
912 n.27 (3d Cir. 1982) (“[T]he Supreme Court appears not to have determined definitively whether changed conditions are a relevant consideration in equal protection analysis.”); Lerner v. Corbett, 972 F. Supp. 2d 676, 682 (M.D. Pa. 2013) (“As a general matter,
it is unclear whether consideration of changed circumstances is appropriate to an equal
protection inquiry.”); Jones v. Schneiderman, 888 F. Supp. 2d 421, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(“[T]he Second Circuit has not expressly embraced the view that changed circumstances
may be considered as part of a rational basis review.”).
Murillo, 681 F.2d at 911–12 & n.27; see Burlington, 763 F.2d at 1111 n.3 (“In construing
statutory language, a court must ordinarily consider the circumstances at the time of passage, rather than later interpretations or statements of purpose. Where courts have invalidated archaic statutes, there is often an independent constitutional basis for so doing
(i.e., a belated recognition that the statutes were unconstitutional as written).” (citations
omitted)).
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the decisional rules used to implement equal protection. Also, Part
II.A differentiates contemporary contextual analysis from the effect of
changed social values on constitutional interpretation. Part II.B uses
racial classifications under strict scrutiny to demonstrate the importance of contemporary contextual analysis and its vitality in the
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court. Part II.C assesses the confusion
in the lower courts about whether contemporary contextual analysis
should be applied in rational basis review and concludes that it must
be applied at even the lowest level of scrutiny.
I. THE CONVENTIONAL VIEW: CONSTITUTIONAL RESULTS SHOULD BE
PERMANENT
Laypersons, lawyers, and even judges tend to believe, or at least
espouse the view, that the results of constitutional adjudications
should be afforded some degree of permanence. A statute, once
held constitutional, must be constitutional for all time. The underlying assumption of this conventional view is that results of such an important nature cannot be changed without altering the methods by
which judges make constitutional determinations. The desire to conform to this conventional view stems from concerns for the rule of
law and the legitimacy of the judiciary, and in particular the legitima6
cy of the Supreme Court.
The Court, of course, is sheltered from the normal forces of political accountability. Unlike the legislative and executive branches, the
Justices harbor no fear of being removed from the bench during the
next election cycle; no election will come to redeem an ill-advised decision. Moreover, the Court is the final arbiter of federal constitutional issues. No higher court can be called upon to overrule its
7
holdings, and the process for amending the Constitution is so diffi8
cult that the Court’s decisions will in all likelihood survive.
9
Holding this great power of finality in “say[ing] what the law is,”
forces the Court to be the principal guardian of its own legitimacy.

6
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See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298–99 (1978) (“[T]he mutability
of a constitutional principle, based upon shifting political and social judgments, undermines the chances for consistent application of the Constitution from one generation to
the next, a critical feature of its coherent interpretation.”).
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” (emphasis added)).
Id. at art. V (providing for a process that demands multiple supermajorities in Congress
and the states to amend the Constitution).
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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With each ruling, the Justices must consider how the public and other governmental actors will perceive their institution. Justice Robert
H. Jackson noted the Court’s precarious position, when he explained,
“We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only
10
because we are final.” While no one considers the Court infallible
in fact, it is important for the Court to maintain the appearance of
stability and continuity. That stability and continuity in the judicial
decision-making process encourages respect for the law, compliance
with the law, and support for the judiciary as an institution.
11
The doctrine of stare decisis, or the strong respect for precedent,
epitomizes the Court’s efforts to preserve the rule of law and its institutional integrity. Under its most general definition, stare decisis
suggests that once an issue has been decided in a particular way, fu12
ture courts should resolve that same issue in the same way. Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey offers one of the
13
Court’s most thorough discussions of stare decisis. In Casey, the
14
Court reaffirmed the essential holding of Roe v. Wade in the face of
15
tremendous public pressure to reverse course. Roe recognized the
16
right of a woman to abort her pregnancy prior to viability. When
the Court decided Casey, a persistent and vocal opposition had chal17
lenged the Roe holding for nineteen years. Nonetheless, the Court
refused to overrule its previous interpretation of the Due Process
18
Clause and used stare decisis to fend off the attack.
The Casey Court began its opinion with a general declaration in
favor of the stability of constitutional results: “Liberty finds no refuge
19
in a jurisprudence of doubt.” The Court then broadly defined the
boundaries of stare decisis, when it explained,
The obligation to follow precedent begins with necessity, and a contrary necessity marks its outer limit. . . . [W]e recognize that no judicial
system could do society’s work if it eyed each issue afresh in every case
that raised it. Indeed, the very concept of the rule of law underlying our

10
11

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
“Stare decisis” is the shortened form of the Latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere,
meaning “[t]o stand by things decided, and not to disturb settled points.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1537 (9th ed. 2009).
Kermit Roosevelt III, Polyphonic Stare Decisis: Listening to Non-Article III Actors, 83 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1303, 1304 (2008).
505 U.S. 833, 854–63 (1992).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Casey, 505 U.S. at 868–69.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 153, 163.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 869.
Id.
Id. at 844.
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own Constitution requires such continuity over time that a respect for
precedent is, by definition, indispensible. At the other extreme, a different necessity would make itself felt if a prior judicial ruling should come
to be seen so clearly as error that its enforcement was for that very reason
20
doomed.

Therefore, stare decisis is not an “inexorable command”; it contains a component of flexibility and is guided by “prudential and
21
pragmatic considerations.” The prudential and pragmatic inquiry
of stare decisis requires the Court to assess (1) “whether the rule has
22
proven to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability”; (2)
“whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a
special hardship to the consequences of overruling and add inequity
23
to the cost of repudiation”; (3) “whether related principles of law
have so far developed as to have left the old rule no more than a
24
remnant of abandoned doctrine”; and (4) “whether facts have so
changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old
25
rule of significant application or justification.”
The Court’s articulation of the stare decisis inquiry supports the
conventional view that constitutional results should be afforded a degree of permanence. In particular, the inquiry’s second question,
26
whether a reliance interest would be subjected to special hardship, is
bound up in the public’s perception of how the Court reaches its decisions. Those people who have relied on a previous ruling would be
upset if the Court later reverses the decision and destroys the reliance
interest. In their anger, those people would also likely attribute the
reversal to improper, political motives—motives supposedly unfit for
officers of the judiciary.
Yet, the fourth question of the stare decisis inquiry asks whether
changed factual conditions have robbed the old rule of significant
27
application or justification. The idea of overruling a constitutional
decision because the external facts have evolved appears to be in tension with the favorable treatment of reliance interests. It is conceivable that people could build an intense reliance interest on a judicial
decision even though changed facts have eroded that decision’s justification. If judges must defer to the reliance interest, a true contem20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

Id. at 854 (citations omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 855.
Id.
Id. at 854.
Id. at 855.
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porary contextual analysis under the Equal Protection Clause is
doomed by stare decisis and the conventional view of constitutional
results.
However, the prognosis need not be so grim; stare decisis can be
reconciled to some extent with contemporary contextual analysis.
There are two central arguments for reconciliation. First, one might
argue that stare decisis is a prudential rule made by judges and does
28
not itself emanate from the Constitution, and when stare decisis
conflicts with contemporary contextual analysis, the demands of the
29
Equal Protection Clause must override the prudential consideration.
While forceful, that argument sweeps too far in its willingness to
disregard stare decisis. There is current scholarly debate about
30
whether stare decisis is itself required by the Constitution. To say
that courts may not always be required to follow precedent is quite
different from saying that courts never need to adhere to prior deci31
sions. At minimum, the Constitution may demand a weak form of
32
stare decisis. Perhaps, the constitutional grounding for stare decisis
33
is located in the nature of Article III “judicial power.” Stare decisis
may be a feature of judicial power that distinguishes it from legislative
34
power and legitimizes the process of adjudication. Alternatively, the
constitutional locus of stare decisis could be the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause and the equal protection component
of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, which require equal

28
29

30

31
32
33
34

See id. at 854–55.
See Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not as Radical as It Sounds,
22 CONST. COMMENT. 257, 259 (2005) (arguing for rejecting the doctrine of stare decisis
when originalism and precedent conflict); Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against
Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23, 25–28 (1994) (explaining that federal courts are
obligated to search for the true meaning of the Constitution, not the meaning ascribed to
it by Congress, the President, or even precedent); Gary Lawson, Mostly Unconstitutional:
The Case Against Precedent Revisited, 5 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1, 3 (2007) (arguing that, if the
Supreme Court wants to conform to the Constitution, it must never choose precedent
over an examination of constitutional meaning).
See John Harrison, The Power of Congress over the Rules of Precedent, 50 DUKE L.J. 503, 513
(2000) (noting that, although some scholars thinks that stare decisis is constitutionally
mandated, the text of the Constitution says little on the subject); Michael Stokes Paulsen,
Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535, 1547–48 (2000) (arguing that stare decisis is a policy judgment,
not a requirment specified in the Constitution or implicit in its articles or structure);
Roosevelt, supra note 12, at 1308–14 (arguing, in contrast to Paulsen, that some sort of respect for precedent is constitutionally required).
Roosevelt, supra note 12, at 1308–12.
Id.
Id. at 1308–09.
Id.
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treatment for similarly situated individuals.35 Without stare decisis,
nothing prevents a court from treating two identical litigants in dif36
ferent ways. The first litigant could benefit from a legal rule, and
then the court could deny that benefit to the second litigant by refus37
ing to apply the same legal rule. It is difficult to conceive of a more
38
literal denial of equal protection of the laws. In reconciling the tension between stare decisis and contemporary contextual analysis, disregarding stare decisis as a mere prudential rule does not offer the
best solution. Stare decisis may itself be rooted in the Constitution,
and even if it is not, the doctrine is still integral to the legitimization
of the judicial role.
The second argument for reconciliation takes a more tempered
approach. Reaching a new constitutional result in a particular case
based on contemporary contextual analysis does not necessitate over39
ruling the previous, contrary decision and implicating stare decisis.
40
Overruling or adhering to precedent is not a unitary concept. The
Court’s process is not as simple as Justice Owen Roberts asserted, “to
lay the article of the Constitution which is invoked beside the statute
which is challenged and to decide whether the latter squares with the
41
former.”
Rather, constitutional adjudication is better understood as a three42
part process under the decisional rules model. First, the Court must
43
decide what operative proposition of the Constitution applies. For
instance, the operative proposition underlying the Equal Protection
Clause is often stated as the government must not subject similarly
situated individuals to different treatment without adequate justifica44
tion. Second, the Court must devise decisional rules to implement
45
the operative proposition. Here, the Court has adopted three levels
of scrutiny—strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis
review—as the decisional rules implementing the operative proposi-

35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45

Id. at 1309–10.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Roosevelt, supra note 12, at 1315–19 (analyzing the Court’s modification of Roe’s trimester framework in Casey).
Id. at 1319.
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936).
Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitutional Calcification: How the Law Becomes What the Court Does,
91 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1655–58 (2005).
Id. at 1657.
Id.
Id. at 1658.
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tion of equal protection.46 Third, the Court must apply its decisional
47
rules to the facts of concrete cases.
Contemporary contextual analysis occurs at the third step of constitutional adjudication and does not alter the operative proposition
or decisional rules of the Equal Protection Clause. Because contemporary contextual analysis operates at the application step, overruling
a prior decision is unnecessary for reaching a different constitutional
result—the precedent implicated can simply be distinguished on factual grounds. Suppose that, in 1960, the Court upheld a statute that
banned a particular drug only because the legislature rationally believed that the drug caused cancer. Over the next forty years, scientists continued their research and developed a perfect fix for the carcinogenic effects. Then, in 2000, the ban is again challenged, but the
plaintiff presents conclusive scientific evidence that dispels any link between the drug and cancer. The Court should strike down the ban
because the changed factual conditions destroyed the legislature’s rational basis. In holding that the ban is unconstitutional, the Court
would apply the same operative proposition and decisional rule as it
did in the 1960 case, but the opposite result would be reached. The
Court could reconcile the new result with stare decisis by distinguishing the two cases based on the differences in the available facts at the
time of each decision. The Court would not need to declare that the
1920 decision was incorrect, as the scientists’ fix for the drug did not
48
then exist. Distinguishing prior rulings based on their facts allows
the Court to use contemporary contextual analysis without frustrating
the legitimation goals of stare decisis.
Beyond the doctrine of stare decisis, Justices repeatedly conform
49
their reasoning to the conventional view of constitutional results.
46
47
48

49

Id. at 1676–80 (“That the tiers of scrutiny are not operative propositions but decisional
rules is well known.”).
Id. at 1658.
This example is adapted from a similar hypothetical scenario offered by Scott H. Bice,
which involved a food additive linked to a disease. See Scott H. Bice, Rationality Analysis in
Constitutional Law, 65 MINN. L. REV. 1, 33–34 (1980). There is, however, a major distinction between the two illustrations. Bice’s scenario states that the plaintiff showed conclusive evidence that the link between the food additive and the disease never existed, rather
than that scientists developed a perfect fix after the first court challenge. Id. at 34. Under those circumstances, contemporary contextual analysis produces harsher results, at
least in relation to stare decisis, because the factual premises upon which the court relied
in its first decision did prove to be incorrect. The changed factual conditions had nothing to do with modifications to the food additive and, instead, concerned improvements
in the ability to discern the additive’s preexisting properties.
See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 568 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[I]n my
view the function of this Court is to preserve our society’s values regarding (among other
things) equal protection, not to revise them; to prevent backsliding from the degree of re-
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For example, Justice Lewis Powell’s rejection of different tiers of scrutiny for anti-majority and anti-minority classifications in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke shows a deep concern that the Court’s
legitimacy will be damaged if the contents of its rulings fluctuate with
50
shifts in political power. In Bakke, the Court held that the Equal
Protection Clause forbids the use of pure racial or ethnic quotas in
51
the admissions process of a public medical school. Instead, race or
ethnicity could be considered permissibly as a “plus” factor in the in52
dividualized review of a particular applicant’s admissions file.
Justice Powell explained his opposition to the use of different tiers
of scrutiny for anti-majority and anti-minority classifications, when he
stated,
By hitching the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause to these
transitory considerations, we would be holding, as a constitutional principle, that judicial scrutiny of classifications touching on racial and ethnic
background may vary with the ebb and flow of political forces. . . . [T]he
mutability of a constitutional principle, based upon shifting political and
social judgments, undermines the chances for consistent application of
the Constitution from one generation to the next, a critical feature of its
53
coherent interpretation.

Powell’s statement exemplifies the conventional view in his concern
that different generations should have a common experience with
the Constitution. He argued that the Court and its constitutional interpretations must not appear to be swayed by fluctuations of political
power in the same way that the legislative and executive branches
54
must be swayed because they are subject to popular elections. His
words give the impression that the Court should be above the un55
seemly workings of politics. While it is unrealistic to assume that the
Court is not influenced by political pressure and that its Justices do
not advance ideological positions on certain issues, a prevalent theme
of the conventional view is that the Court and the Constitution are
separate from the political battles dividing Americans. The conven-

50
51
52
53
54
55

striction the Constitution imposed upon democratic government, not to prescribe, on
our own authority, progressively higher degrees.”); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 298–300 (1978) (“In expounding the Constitution, the Court's role is to
discern ‘principles sufficiently absolute to give them roots throughout the community
and continuity over significant periods of time, and to lift them above the level of the
pragmatic political judgments of a particular time and place.’” (citing ARCHIBALD COX,
THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 114 (1976))).
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298–99.
Id. at 307.
Id. at 317–18.
Id. at 298–99 (citations omitted).
See id.
See id.
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tional view portrays the Constitution and its implementing principles
as constant, unifying forces—anchors of stability and legitimacy.
Though Justice Powell grounds his reasoning in the conventional
view, he implicitly accepts the central concept behind contemporary
contextual analysis under the Equal Protection Clause. The use of
contemporary contextual analysis means that changing factual conditions could lead to different constitutional results on the same issue
even though no alteration to the controlling operative proposition or
decisional rule occurred. Justice Powell did not reject the idea that
under one set of facts a classification may comply with the Equal Protection Clause, while under a different set of facts that same law may
be an unconstitutional denial of equal protection.
Instead, Justice Powell’s Bakke opinion rejected the notion that, as
a preliminary matter, the Court should engage in a case-specific, po56
litical-power analysis to determine the controlling decisional rule.
Powell viewed such a political-power analysis as an imprudent exer57
cise—an attempt at simplifying and synthesizing a murky subject.
Powell indicated that the Court in its role as interpreter of the Constitution was not the proper institution for such a task: “Political judgments regarding the necessity for the particular classification may be
weighed in the constitutional balance, but the standard of justification will remain constant. This is as it should be, since those political
judgments are the product of rough compromise struck by contend58
ing groups within the democratic process.”
The conventional view that constitutional results should be permanent plays an important role in the American constitutional system. The conventional view helps to ensure respect for the rule of
law and the legitimacy of the unelected federal judiciary. At first
glance, the conventional view seems to undermine contemporary
contextual analysis under the Equal Protection Clause, but this initial
assessment is mistaken. The conventional view is focused predominately on the consistent application of operative propositions and decisional rules, and contemporary contextual analysis does not interfere with that focus. To be effectuated, decisional rules must be
59
When factual conditions
applied to the facts of concrete cases.
change, analysis under even the most stable decisional rule can yield
a new constitutional result. Therefore, the conventional view and

56
57
58
59

Id. at 299.
See id.
Id. (citations omitted).
See Roosevelt, supra note 42, at 1658.
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contemporary contextual analysis can and should coexist without
perceived judicial impropriety.
II. CONTEMPORARY CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS UNDER THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE
A. An Overview
Proper analysis under the Equal Protection Clause demands that a
court assess classifications in light of changed factual conditions, no
matter the level of scrutiny involved. As discussed above, the initial
assumption that contemporary contextual analysis cannot be squared
with the conventional view and its judicial legitimacy goals is mistaken. Not only can it be reconciled with the conventional view, but taking into account current conditions promotes the legitimacy of the
courts and legislatures to an even greater extent. Contemporary contextual analysis limits governmental power. In its absence, classifications may become untethered from factual reality with the passage of
time. The duty to enforce this connection to reality falls upon the
courts. If the judiciary fails to maintain a system of constitutional laws
by engaging in contemporary contextual analysis, its inaction may be
viewed as illegitimate deference to misinformed reasoning or as simple incompetence. Moreover, judicial neglect in ensuring that the
law is up to date may cause the legislature to be viewed as an overreaching institution because its outmoded statutes place unjustified
burdens on the public.
To comprehend the importance of contemporary contextual
analysis in equal protection law, a brief overview of how courts implement the Equal Protection Clause is necessary. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states, “No State
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec60
tion of the laws.” While the Fourteenth Amendment only applies to
the states, this guarantee of equal protection has been made applicable to the federal government as a component of the Due Process
61
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Therefore, this Comment’s references to contemporary contextual analysis under the Equal Protection Clause pertain to judicial review of classifications created by state
and federal law.

60
61

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498–99 (1954); see U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person
shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”).
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Proceeding under the decisional rules model, a common statement of the operative proposition of the Equal Protection Clause is
that the government cannot subject similarly situated individuals to
62
different treatment without adequate justification. To implement
that operative proposition the Supreme Court devised three decisional rules known as the levels of scrutiny: strict scrutiny, intermedi63
ate scrutiny, and rational basis review. The most demanding review,
strict scrutiny, requires that a classification be narrowly tailored to
64
further a compelling governmental interest. The middle level, intermediate scrutiny, requires that a classification be substantially re65
lated to an important governmental objective. Finally, the lowest
and least-probing level, rational basis review, requires only that a clas66
sification be rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.
The level of scrutiny governing a particular case depends on
whether the classification involved implicates certain suspect classes
or fundamental interests. Strict scrutiny is applied when the classification makes distinctions based on the suspect classes of race, ethnic67
ity, national origin, and alienage. Strict scrutiny also governs when
the classification affects a fundamental interest, such as voting and
68
court access. Intermediate scrutiny is used when the classification
makes distinctions based on the quasi-suspect classes of gender and
69
illegitimacy. If the classification does not implicate any suspect clas70
ses or fundamental interests, rational basis review will control. Ra-

62
63
64
65
66
67

68

69

70

Roosevelt, supra note 42, at 1657.
Id. at 1676–80.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003).
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992).
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326 (“[The Court] has held that all racial classifications imposed by
government ‘must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.’” (quoting
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995))); Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432
U.S. 1, 7 (1977) (“The Court has ruled that classifications by a State that are based on alienage are ‘inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny.’” (quoting Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971))).
Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 630–33 (1969) (applying strict scrutiny to a classification that limited the privilege to vote); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353, 357–58 (1963) (applying strict scrutiny to a classification that limited the availability
of adequate appellate review).
Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (applying intermediate scrutiny to a classification
based on illegitimacy); Craig, 429 U.S. at 197 (“To withstand constitutional challenge,
previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.”).
Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 10 (“[T]his Court’s cases are clear that, unless a classification warrants some form of heightened review because it jeopardizes exercise of a fundamental
right or categorizes on the basis of an inherently suspect characteristic, the Equal Protec-
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tional basis review is the predominant level of scrutiny for economic
71
and social legislation. The Court applies rational basis review to a
vast range of classifications, including classifications based on wealth,
72
age, and disability.
Despite the differences among these levels of scrutiny, they all
share a common element—each level of scrutiny demands that a
court examine the factual context of the classification. A court cannot determine whether a state interest is compelling, important, or
legitimate without looking to the circumstances surrounding that interest. Furthermore, a court cannot determine whether a classification is narrowly tailored, substantially related, or rationally related
without examining the facts that create the supposed relationship between the classification and the interest. When using strict or intermediate scrutiny, a court may also need to assess the facts demonstrating potential alternatives to the classification.
This connection between factual context and review under the
Equal Protection Clause is significant because facts change over time.
A classification that once satisfied the requirements of equal protection could later become unconstitutional merely because the factual
73
conditions changed. For example, under strict scrutiny, a previously
approved classification could become unconstitutional because the
74
compelling interest no longer exists or because a new alternative to
75
the classification destroyed its narrow tailoring.

71

72

73

74

tion Clause requires only that the classification rationally further a legitimate state interest.”).
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (“The general rule is
that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by
the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. When social or economic legislation is at issue, the Equal Protection Clause allows the States wide latitude, and the
Constitution presumes that even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the
democratic processes.”(citations omitted)).
Id. at 442 (applying rational basis review to a classification based on mental disability);
Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312–14 (1976) (applying rational basis
review to a classification based on old age); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 22–25 (1973) (concluding that wealth is not a suspect class and applying rational basis review).
Developments in the way facts are perceived or discovering new information about old
facts could also have an effect. See generally Angelo N. Ancheta, Science and Constitutional
Fact Finding in Equal Protection Analysis, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 1115 (2008) (discussing the history of scientific data in the factual analyses of the Supreme Court and arguing for expanded use).
Heightened national security risk in wartime is a fleeting compelling interest that dissipates with the threats of war. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219–20 (1944)
(“Citizenship has its responsibilities as well as its privileges, and in time of war the burden
is always heavier. Compulsory exclusion of large groups of citizens from their homes, ex-
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Yet, some courts have failed to recognize the significance of
76
changed factual conditions in their equal protection analyses. Instead, these courts look only to the facts that existed at the time of
77
the classification’s creation. This problem arises commonly when
courts are conducting the most deferent form of inquiry under the
78
Equal Protection Clause—rational basis review. No matter the level
of scrutiny involved, analyzing a classification under the factual conditions of its creation, rather than the current factual conditions, is
not supported by the Supreme Court’s precedent and undermines
79
the constitutional restraints placed on legislative power.
Before exploring contemporary contextual analysis more fully, it
must be distinguished from overruling prior constitutional results
based on changed social values. A change in social values can occur
without a corresponding change in the factual conditions surround80
ing a constitutional issue. For example, in Lawrence v. Texas, the
Court declared unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment a Texas statute that criminalized same-sex
sodomy because it infringed on the liberty of consenting adults to
engage in “the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, . . . in
81
the most private of places, the home.” Lawrence explicitly overruled
82
the Court’s prior decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, which had upheld a

75

76

77
78
79
80
81
82

cept under circumstances of direst emergency and peril, is inconsistent with our basic
governmental institutions.”).
While diversity in higher education might remain a compelling interest, the advent of
race-neutral means for achieving that diversity would destroy the narrow tailoring of racial preferences in the college admissions process. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,
341–43 (2003).
Burlington N. R.R. v. Dep’t of Pub. Serv. Regulation, 763 F.2d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 1985)
(“The Supreme Court has remained ambivalent on whether changed circumstances can
transform a once-rational statute into an irrational law.”); Murillo v. Bambrick, 681 F.2d
898, 912 n.27 (3d Cir. 1982) (“[T]he Supreme Court appears not to have determined definitively whether changed conditions are a relevant consideration in equal protection
analysis.”); Lerner v. Corbett, 972 F. Supp. 2d 676, 682 (M.D. Pa. 2013) (“As a general
matter, it is unclear whether consideration of changed circumstances is appropriate to an
equal protection inquiry.”); Jones v. Schneiderman, 888 F. Supp. 2d 421, 425–27
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“The Second Circuit has not invalidated a statute as irrational based on
changed circumstances.”).
Burlington, 763 F.2d at 1111; Murillo, 681 F.2d at 911–12; Lerner, 972 F. Supp. 2d at 682;
Jones, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 425–27.
Burlington, 763 F.2d at 1110–11; Murillo, 681 F.2d at 910–13; Lerner, 972 F. Supp. 2d at
682; Jones, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 425–27.
See supra Parts II.B–C.
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986).
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567, 578.
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 186.
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similar Georgia anti-sodomy statute.83 In reaching its conclusion, the
Lawrence Court relied on the “emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their
84
private lives in matters pertaining to sex.” The Court referenced a
number of authorities from the United States and Europe to support
its insistence that the values on which Bowers relied no longer provided an adequate justification to place a criminal constraint on this lib85
erty.
The Lawrence Court’s decision to overrule Bowers did not result
from changed factual conditions; it was the product of changed social
values. Between 1986 and 2003, consenting homosexual adults did
not alter their sexual conduct, and the definition of sodomy remained constant. What did develop over those intervening years was
a broader social acceptance of the homosexual community and more
liberal attitudes toward sexuality in general.
That scenario falls outside of the realm of pure contemporary
contextual analysis. Contemporary contextual analysis, as discussed
here, is concerned solely with changes in the hard facts needed to
prove the importance of a governmental interest and the relationship
between that interest and the classification. The previously offered
hypothetical involving a banned drug demonstrates that contemporary contextual analysis is most effective when focused on tangible
facts, rather than public perceptions, which are intangible and often
86
difficult to divine. While there may exist some form of contemporary contextual analysis that considers changed social values, the empirical complexities of defining social values and the question of
whether current social values even ought to influence constitutional
interpretation places that issue well beyond the scope of this Comment.
B. Contemporary Contextual Analysis in Strict Scrutiny: A Brief Study of
Racial Classifications
The Supreme Court has followed contemporary contextual analysis consistently when reviewing racial classifications under strict scru83

84
85

86

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (“Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and
now is overruled.”).
Id. at 572 (emphasis added).
Id. at 572–78 (“To the extent Bowers relied on values we share with a wider civilization, it
should be noted that the reasoning and holding in Bowers have been rejected elsewhere.”).
See supra Part I.
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tiny. The Court’s exacting review of racial classifications highlights
two central features of contemporary contextual analysis: (1) the often transient nature of governmental interests and (2) the potential
of new factual conditions to break down the relationship between
classifications and governmental interests. First, the Court’s analysis
of the restrictions imposed on people of Japanese descent during
World War II demonstrates an emergency governmental interest that
87
dissipated once peace was achieved. Second, the Court’s expectation that racial preferences in higher education will reach a “logical
end point” illustrates that changed factual conditions, such as the development of race-neutral alternatives, could deprive such preferences of their narrowly tailored relationship to the governmental in88
terest of diversity.
During World War II, the United States imposed many restrictions
on the liberty of people of Japanese ancestry, including curfews, ex89
clusion from their homes, and ultimately internment. The power to
install those restrictions derived from President Franklin Delano
90
Roosevelt’s Executive Order No. 9066, issued on February 19, 1942.
Executive Order No. 9066 authorized the Secretary of War and designated Military Commanders to prescribe “military areas” from
which “any or all persons may be excluded, and with respect to
which, the right of any person to enter, remain in, or leave shall be
subject to whatever restrictions the Secretary of War or the appropri91
ate Military Commander may impose in his discretion.” Roosevelt
granted the military those sweeping powers to provide “every possible
protection against espionage and against sabotage to nationaldefense material, national-defense premises, and national-defense
92
utilities.”
On February 20, 1942, the Secretary of War designated Lt. General John L. DeWitt as Military Commander of the Western Defense
93
Command. In March 1942, through a series of public proclama-

87
88
89

90
91
92
93

Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218–20 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States,
320 U.S. 81, 100–01 (1943).
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 341–43 (2003).
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218–19; Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 89–90. See generally Dean Masaru
Hashimoto, The Legacy of Korematsu v. United States: A Dangerous Narrative Retold, 4
ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 72 (1996) (discussing the legal burdens imposed on Japanese people
in the United States during World War II and the ongoing legacy of the Court’s decisions
regarding those burdens).
Hashimoto, supra note 89, at 74–75.
Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942).
Id.
Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 86.
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tions, DeWitt established a military area for the Pacific Coast region
that encompassed the entire states of Arizona, California, Oregon,
94
and Washington. On March 21, 1942, Congress ratified Executive
Order No. 9066, and subsequent military proclamations, by passing
95
legislation that criminalized violations of the military orders. Under
its expanded authority, the military curtailed the liberty of Japanese
people living within the military areas, and in the end, it relocated
approximately 120,000 people, including 70,000 American citizens, to
96
internment camps.
The military’s actions precipitated several challenges for the
Court, perhaps the most well known of which were Hirabayashi v.
97
98
United States and Korematsu v. United States. As a preliminary matter,
three common misconceptions about those cases must be dispelled.
First, neither case considered directly the constitutionality of the now
infamous internment program. Hirabayashi involved a challenge to a
99
curfew imposed on Japanese people in the military areas, while Korematsu concerned the constitutionality of an order excluding that
100
same group from their homes.
Second, though it is often said that strict scrutiny under the Equal
101
Protection Clause originated in Hirabayashi and Korematsu, neither
102
In Hirabayashi and
case contained an equal protection challenge.
Korematsu, the Court decided only that the curfew and exclusion order did not constitute impermissible delegations of legislative power,
exceed Congress’s war powers, or deny due process under the Fifth
103
Amendment. The Court did not even impose the requirements of
equal protection on the federal government until a decade after it
104
decided Hirabayashi and Korematsu.

94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101

102
103
104

Id. at 87.
Act of March 21, 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-503, 56 Stat. 173 (1942); Hashimoto, supra note 89,
at 75.
Hashimoto, supra note 89, at 75.
320 U.S. at 81.
323 U.S. 214 (1944).
Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 83.
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 221–23.
The most notable examples of the Court citing Korematsu to support its application of
strict scrutiny are Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967), and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 236 (1995). See Hashimoto, supra note 89, at 87–89 & n.124 (discussing the frequent use of Korematsu to support the application of strict scrutiny to racial
classifications).
Hashimoto, supra note 89, at 88–89.
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217–18; Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 83, 91–93, 100.
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499–500 (1954); Hashimoto, supra note 89, at 88.
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Third, regardless of the Court’s language, it did not subject the
racial classifications in Hirabayashi and Korematsu to “the most rigid
105
Instead, the Court applied rational basis review.106 The
scrutiny.”
Court showed extreme deference to the government’s articulated in107
terest and raised no concerns about narrow tailoring.
Notwithstanding the deep and recognized flaws of Hirabayashi and
Korematsu, those cases illustrate an important feature of contemporary contextual analysis under the Equal Protection Clause—the transient nature of governmental interests. Though the Court in Hirabayashi and Korematsu only considered the discriminatory nature of
the military’s orders under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause, that analysis, while certainly more deferent, is similar to modern equal protection analysis and offers useful insights about the effect of extreme emergencies on the permissibility of racial classifica108
tions.
In Hirabayashi, the Court assessed the constitutionality of a curfew
that required “all persons of Japanese ancestry residing in [a military]
area be within their place of residence daily between the hours of
109
The Court began its description of the
8:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m.”
government’s interest by discussing the Japanese attack on Pearl
110
Harbor. The Court observed that the extensive damage to the largest American naval base in the Pacific, and the nation’s last line of defense, placed the West Coast in serious danger of air raids and inva111
sion by Japanese forces. The prevention of espionage and sabotage
in the threatened area aided the government’s efforts to defend
112
against any potential Japanese offensive.
The Hirabayashi petitioner, who had been convicted of violating
the curfew, did not contest the severity of the wartime threat or appropriateness of a curfew in thwarting espionage and sabotage, activi105

106

107
108
109
110
111
112

Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216, 218; Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 102; Hashimoto, supra note 89, at
88; Stephen A. Siegel, The Origin of the Compelling State Interest Test and Strict Scrutiny, 48
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 355, 381–82 (2006).
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218 (“Here, as in the Hirabayashi case, ‘we cannot reject as unfounded
the judgment of the military authorities and of Congress . . . .’” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)); Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 102 (“In this case it is enough that circumstances
within the knowledge of those charged with the responsibility for maintaining the national defense afforded a rational basis for the decision which they made.” (emphasis added)); Hashimoto, supra note 89, at 88; Siegel, supra note 105, at 382.
Hashimoto, supra note 89, at 88; Siegel, supra note 105, at 382.
See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218–20; Hirabayshi, 320 U.S. at 100.
Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 83.
Id. at 93–94.
Id. at 94.
Id. at 94–95.
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ties most often conducted in “the hours of darkness.”113 Rather, the
petitioner contended that the application of the curfew to all people
114
of Japanese descent constituted a denial of due process.
The Court prefaced its analysis of that racial classification by stating, “Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are
by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are
founded upon the doctrine of equality. For that reason, legislative
classification or discrimination based on race alone has often been
115
But considerations of
held to be a denial of equal protection.”
116
equality did not prevail in the Court’s final conclusion. The Court
noted that the vast majority of Japanese people living in the United
117
FurStates resided within the military area on the Pacific Coast.
thermore, the Court refused to “reject as unfounded the judgment . . . that there were disloyal members of that population, whose
number and strength could not be precisely and quickly ascer118
tained.” The Court then invoked the special circumstances of war
to support the government’s use of a racial distinction: “[T]he danger of espionage and sabotage, in time of war and of threatened invasion, calls upon the military authorities to scrutinize every relevant
119
In
fact bearing on the loyalty of populations in the danger areas.”
holding that the curfew’s application to all people of Japanese ancestry did not deny due process, the Court reasoned that “[t]he fact
alone that attack on our shores was threatened by Japan rather than
another enemy power set these citizens apart from others who have
120
no particular associations with Japan.”
In Korematsu, the Court returned to its reasoning in the Hirabayashi decision but placed greater emphasis on the wartime emer121
gency. The Korematsu petitioner argued that a military order, which
excluded all people of Japanese ancestry from their homes in the
West Coast military area, resulted in an unconstitutional denial of
122
Again, the Court began its discussion by explaining
due process.
the general presumption against racial classifications:

113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122

Id. at 99.
Id. at 100.
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).
Id. at 100–01.
Id. at 96.
Id. at 99.
Id. at 100.
Id. at 101.
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218–20 (1944).
Id. at 215–16.
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It should be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions which curtail
the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is
not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that
courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial an123
tagonism never can.

Nevertheless, the Court found that, even under “the most rigid scru124
tiny,” the difficulties of war permitted the exclusion order.
The Court explained that the reason for the temporary exclusion
of Japanese people rested on the same ground as the curfew—the
125
prevention of espionage and sabotage in vulnerable areas. It then
stated that investigations made subsequent to exclusion confirmed
126
In
the disloyalty of certain members of the Japanese population.
concluding that the exclusion order complied with the demands of
due process, the Court highlighted the government’s vital interest in
the successful prosecution of war and the intense, yet temporary,
burdens citizens must bear:
[H]ardships are part of war, and war is an aggregation of hardships. All
citizens alike, both in and out of uniform, feel the impact of war in greater or lesser measure. Citizenship has its responsibilities as well as its privileges, and in time of war the burden is always heavier. Compulsory exclusion of large groups of citizens from their homes, except under
circumstances of direst emergency and peril, is inconsistent with our
basic governmental institutions. But when under conditions of modern
warfare our shores are threatened by hostile forces, the power to protect
127
must be commensurate with the threatened danger.

For the purposes of contemporary contextual analysis, Hirabayashi
and Korematsu demonstrate the fleeting nature of governmental interests. In its opinions, the Court placed great emphasis on the serious danger presented by World War II and the government’s need to
128
Given that emtake swift action in securing the national defense.
phasis on the government’s wartime interest, it is highly doubtful that
the Court would have permitted similar racial classifications in a time
of peace or the continuation of such classifications long after the
123
124
125
126

127
128

Id. at 216.
Id. at 216, 218–20.
Id. at 217–19.
Id. at 219. To support its claims about the disloyal elements of the Japanese population,
the Court referenced reports that approximately five thousand American citizens of Japanese ancestry refused to swear unqualified allegiance to the United States and that several thousand evacuees requested repatriation to Japan. Id. This evidence failed to account for resentment toward the United States engendered by the exclusion order and
internment. Hashimoto, supra note 89, at 81.
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 219–20.
Id. at 218–20; Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S 81, 100 (1943).
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war’s end. Governmental interests, like a successful war effort, that
are both extreme and transient illustrate how contemporary contextual analysis may produce different constitutional results without manipulating the applicable decisional rule. When a racial classification
is created in response to a particular emergency and that emergency
ceases, the constitutionality of the classification must cease as well.
Here, contemporary contextual analysis is acting as a restraint on
government power. If a court looked only to the facts that existed
when the government established an emergency racial classification,
the constitutionality of that classification could persist indefinitely.
As the supporting emergency dissipates, such an unchecked classification will transform from a necessity to invidious discrimination.
Recognizing that a governmental interest may break down over
time addresses only the first half of strict scrutiny and equal protection analysis more generally. To understand fully the importance of
contemporary contextual analysis, the logical relationship between
the classification and the interest it is supposed to further must be
examined. Under strict scrutiny, this logical relationship is ensured
129
Similar to a transient governmental inthrough narrow tailoring.
terest, changed factual conditions can also cause the narrow tailoring
of a classification to be lost.
Grutter v. Bollinger provides a prominent example of the Court’s
endorsement of contemporary contextual analysis in assessing wheth130
In Grutter, the Court
er a racial classification is narrowly tailored.
concluded that the race-conscious admissions process of the University of Michigan Law School, a public institution, complied with the re131
quirements of the Equal Protection Clause. At the start of its strict
scrutiny analysis, the Court found that the law school possessed a
132
compelling interest in attaining a diverse student body. The Court
explained that diversity in higher education promotes racial understanding, improves learning outcomes, prepares students for the
modern workplace, and opens the paths of leadership to a wider
133
range of people. Next, the Court determined that the law school’s
use of race as a single factor in an individualized, holistic review of
each applicant was narrowly tailored to further the compelling inter134
This narrow tailoring rested largely on the law
est of diversity.
129
130
131
132
133
134

Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003).
Id. at 341–43.
Id. at 343.
Id. at 329.
Id. at 329–33.
Id. at 337.
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school’s “serious, good faith consideration” of potential race-neutral
alternatives and the finding that those alternatives were unworka135
ble.
Having decided that the law school’s admissions process passed
strict scrutiny, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor closed the Court’s opin136
ion by stating that such racial preferences “must be limited in time.”
Justice O’Connor explained that race-conscious admissions processes
are not exempt from “the requirement that all governmental use of
137
That “logical end point” will
race must have a logical end point.”
be found through “periodic reviews to determine whether racial
138
preferences are still necessary to achieve student body diversity.”
The development of effective race-neutral alternatives or continuing
increases in the number of minority applicants attaining higher
grades and test scores might undermine the racial classification’s nar139
row tailoring. She then finished with what is now known as the sunset provision for affirmative action in higher education: “We expect
that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be
140
necessary to further the interest approved today.”
The Grutter Court’s discussion of a “logical end point” for racial
classifications and the sunset provision are explicit endorsements of
contemporary contextual analysis under the Equal Protection
141
Clause. The expectation that racial preferences will not be needed
by 2028 should not be construed as a strict time limit on the use of
142
affirmative action. Instead, it is better characterized as a statement
of the Court’s intention to continually reassess the factual conditions
on which Grutter’s narrow-tailoring inquiry relied. Subsequent
changes to the factual conditions could undermine the narrow tailoring of race-conscious admissions in a number of ways. For example,
improved grades and test scores among minority applications could
enable schools to achieve diversity without offering racial prefer135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142

Id. at 339–40.
Id. at 342.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 342–43.
Id. at 343.
Id. at 342–43.
Joel K. Goldstein, Justice O’Connor’s Twenty-Five Year Expectation: The Legitimacy of Durational
Limits in Grutter, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 83, 104 (2006) (“Grutter reflected an expectation that
race-conscious admissions will be unnecessary by 2028 rather than a holding or a mere
hope to that effect.”). But see Grutter, 539 U.S. at 370 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“The Court will not even deign to make the Law School try other
methods, however, preferring instead to grant a 25-year license to violate the Constitution.”).
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ences, or a workable race-neutral alternative could be developed.
Those potential changes may lead the Court to conclude that raceconscious admissions no longer pass constitutional muster. Here,
Grutter demonstrates the significance of contemporary contextual
analysis when testing the relationship between a racial classification
and the interest it is meant to further. While diversity in higher education will likely remain a compelling interest, racial preferences may
someday be an overly burdensome method for promoting that interest.
The foregoing cases demonstrate the Court’s consistent use of
contemporary contextual analysis under strict scrutiny. Through that
analysis, the Court examines both the facts supporting governmental
interests and the facts establishing a relationship between classifications and interests. While strict scrutiny provides extreme examples,
it is not unique among the levels of scrutiny in containing a contextual component. Each level of scrutiny requires an assessment of the
factual context at the time of the constitutional challenge. The lessons learned from the application of strict scrutiny must be carried
through to the more deferent forms of review.
C. Contemporary Contextual Analysis in Rational Basis Review
The acceptance of contemporary contextual analysis in strict scrutiny should be explicitly extended to rational basis review under the
Equal Protection Clause. Rational basis review, which requires that a
classification be rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest, contains the same contextual component as strict scrutiny. To
determine whether a governmental interest is legitimate or whether a
classification bears a rational relationship to a particular interest, a
court must examine the factual conditions at the time of the constitutional challenge. The Supreme Court’s due process jurisprudence
indicates that rational basis review demands this assessment of the
current facts. Moreover, contemporary contextual analysis in rational
basis review restrains government power and legitimizes the actions
of courts and legislatures.
While the logical structures of strict scrutiny and rational basis review share a contextual component, these levels of scrutiny diverge in
their assessments of legislative purpose. A compelling interest under
strict scrutiny requires that the asserted interest have been the legisla143
That actual purpose
ture’s actual purpose for the classification.

143

Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 908 n.4 (1996).
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must also be supported by strong evidence.144 In contrast, a legitimate
interest under rational basis review requires only that the asserted in145
The legislaterest be a conceivable purpose for the classification.
tive record need not evidence any consideration of the conceivable
purpose; whether that conceivable purpose actually motivated the
146
legislature is irrelevant. That divergence creates a slight difference
between applying contemporary contextual analysis in strict scrutiny
and applying such analysis in rational basis review.
The focus on actual purpose in strict scrutiny causes contemporary contextual analysis to act as a greater restriction on legislative
power. Once changed factual conditions eliminate a classification’s
compelling interest, no new compelling interest, which arose after
the changed facts, can be substituted to support the classification.
That substitute compelling interest could not have been the actual
purpose for the classification because a legislature cannot consider
factual conditions of which it is not yet aware. A court reviewing a
classification supported only by a newly substituted compelling interest would be forced to strike down that classification under strict scrutiny. This result comports with the purposes of strict scrutiny. Strict
scrutiny is invoked to review classifications implicating suspect classes
and fundamental interests—subject matters that present the greatest
147
potential for invidious discrimination. A legislature should not be
able to justify such dubious classifications with compelling interests
that it never contemplated.
While the interplay between actual purpose and contemporary
contextual analysis means that new compelling interests cannot
emerge after a classification’s creation, it does not prevent a legislature from establishing a classification based on multiple compelling
interests, each supported by the requisite actual purpose. If changed
factual conditions undermine one or more of a classification’s compelling interests, the classification can still survive strict scrutiny provided that at least one of its compelling interests remains valid under
the new facts and that compelling interest was an actual purpose of
the legislature when it created the classification.
The restrictiveness of requiring actual purpose in strict scrutiny
offers a stark contrast to the flexibility granted by the combination of
conceivable purpose and contemporary contextual analysis in rational basis review. Though contemporary contextual analysis in rational
144
145
146
147

Id.
FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313–14 (1993).
Id. at 315.
See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text.
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basis review allows for the uncommon situation in which changed factual conditions eliminate a legitimate interest, contemporary contextual analysis also permits substitute legitimate interests to arise from
those changed facts. In rational basis review, a legislature can take
advantage of substitute legitimate interests because a conceivable
purpose does not require that the legislature have actually considered
the interest in establishing the classification. This relaxed stance on
substitute legitimate interests is consistent with the flexible and deferent nature of rational basis review. Rational basis review applies to
all classifications that do not implicate suspect or quasi-suspect classes
and fundamental interests, and such classifications are unlikely to be
148
devised for invidious discrimination.
Therefore, in both strict scrutiny and rational basis review, contemporary contextual analysis, when coupled with the corresponding
model of legislative purpose, accentuates the underlying nature of
each level of scrutiny. First, strict scrutiny becomes more restrictive
because a legislature cannot justify its classifications with substitute
compelling interests that it could not have considered. Second, rational basis review becomes more flexible because a legislature can
take advantage of substitute legitimate interests that arise under
changed factual conditions.
Having examined some aspects of how contemporary contextual
analysis operates in rational basis review under the Equal Protection
Clause, it is vital to evaluate the precedential and theoretical support
for using contemporary contextual analysis at the lowest level of scrutiny. The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence is filled with a long history
of contemporary contextual analysis in rational basis review under
the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Some of the Court’s most revered jurists recognized that oncerational laws could be rendered irrational under new and unforeseen
facts. In 1924, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., endorsed contemporary contextual analysis by acknowledging that legislative predictions of future facts are sometimes flawed:
But even as to [declarations of the legislature,] a Court is not at liberty to
shut its eyes to an obvious mistake, when the validity of the law depends
upon the truth of what is declared. And still more obviously so far as this
declaration looks to the future it can be no more than prophecy and is liable to be controlled by events. A law depending upon the existence of
an emergency or other certain state of facts to uphold it may cease to op-

148

See supra notes 70–72 and accompanying text.
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erate if the emergency ceases or the facts change even though valid when
149
passed.

Then, in 1931, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes followed the same
reasoning, when he explained, “a police regulation, although valid
when made, may become, by reason of later events, arbitrary and
150
confiscatory in operation.” In 1935, Justice Louis D. Brandeis also
supported contemporary contextual analysis: “A statute valid as to
one set of facts may be invalid as to another. A statute valid when enacted may become invalid by change in the conditions to which it is
151
applied.”
Though contemporary contextual analysis in rational basis review
holds a prominent position in the Court’s case law, some misleading
authority does exist in the equal protection field. In 1911, the
Court’s opinion in Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co. directed the focus of rational basis review towards the facts at the time of a classifica152
tion’s creation. The Court stated, “When the classification in such a
law is called in question, if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the
153
time the law was enacted must be assumed.” Rather than disputing
the propriety contemporary contextual analysis, this language is more
concerned with expressing the higher degree of deference required
by rational basis review. There is no indication that the Lindsley
Court had reason to consider changed factual conditions.
154
Even so, United States v. Carolene Products Co. and Minnesota v.
155
Clover Leaf Creamery Co. have created the most confusion in the lower courts about whether contemporary contextual analysis should be
156
applied in rational basis review. Carolene Products provides a strong
statement in favor of examining the current factual conditions in ra157
tional basis review. The Court explained that “the constitutionality

149
150

151
152
153
154
155
156

157

Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543, 547–48 (1924) (citations omitted).
Abie State Bank v. Weaver, 282 U.S. 765, 772 (1931); see Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 442 (1934) (Hughes, C.J.) (“It is always open to judicial inquiry
whether the exigency still exists upon which the continued operation of the law depends.”).
Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405, 415 (1935) (footnote omitted).
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
Id.
304 U.S. 104 (1938).
449 U.S. 456 (1981).
Burlington N. R.R. v. Dep’t Pub. Serv. Regulation, 763 F.2d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 1985);
Murillo v. Bambrick, 681 F.2d 898, 912 n.27 (3d Cir. 1982); Lerner v. Corbett, 972 F.
Supp. 2d. 676, 682 (M.D. Pa. 2013); Jones v. Schneiderman, 888 F. Supp. 2d 421, 425–26
(S.D.N.Y. 2012).
Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 153.
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of a statute predicated upon the existence of a particular state of facts
may be challenged by showing to the court that those facts have
158
ceased to exist.” But Carolene Products also contains a more general
discussion of the deference afforded to the legislature in rational basis review, unrelated to the specific point on contemporary contextual analysis:
But by their very nature such inquiries, where the legislative judgment is
drawn in question, must be restricted to the issue whether any state of
facts either known or which could be assumed affords support for it.
Here the demurrer challenges the validity of the statute on its face and it
is evident from all the considerations presented to Congress, and those of
which we may take judicial notice, that the question is at least debatable
159
....

Subsequent references to this “at least debatable” language have created uncertainty about whether contemporary contextual analysis
160
operates in rational basis review.
In Clover Leaf Creamery, the Court quoted the deferential language
of Carolene Products and made it appear as though courts should al161
The
ways look back to the time of the classification’s creation.
Court stated,
Although parties challenging legislation under the Equal Protection
Clause may introduce evidence supporting their claim that it is irrational,
they cannot prevail so long as “it is evident from all the considerations
presented to [the legislature], and those of which we may take judicial
notice, that the question is at least debatable.” Where there was evidence
before the legislature reasonably supporting the classification, litigants
may not procure invalidation of the legislation merely by tendering evi162
dence in court that the legislature was mistaken.

But resolving questionable issues at the time of passage in favor of the
legislature’s determination is distinct from considering changed factual conditions that occur subsequent to passage. The Court emphasized that the legislature held evidence “reasonably supporting the
classification,” and the case did not present the issue of whether new
163
facts showed that the initial evidence was now irrelevant.
With this intense focus on judicial deference to legislative decisions, it is not surprising that lower federal courts have identified the
use of contemporary contextual analysis in rational basis review as an
158
159
160
161
162
163

Id.
Id. at 154 (emphasis added).
See Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. at 464 (quoting Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 153–54) (citations omitted).
Id.
Id. (quoting Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 153–54) (citations omitted).
Id.
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unresolved issue.164 The Third Circuit and Ninth Circuit raised the
165
question explicitly. Those courts argued that contemporary contextual analysis overburdens legislative bodies and is beyond the institu166
tional competence of the judiciary.
In Murillo v. Bambrick, the plaintiffs brought a class action alleging
that a New Jersey statute and court rule that assessed higher fees in
matrimonial actions than in other civil actions violated the Equal Pro167
According to the challenged provisions, matrimotection Clause.
nial actions, even if uncontested, could not be listed for trial until the
168
If the matrimonial acplaintiff paid an additional fifty-dollar fee.
tion was contested, the provision required the plaintiff to submit an169
other ten-dollar payment to cover the cost of stenographic services.
These fees originated as a mechanism to finance the use of special
masters in resolving matrimonial actions prior to the adoption of no170
fault divorce. In 1948, the New Jersey legislature abolished the use
of special masters in such proceedings, but collection of the fees persisted because the duties of the former special masters then needed
171
However, in 1971, the legislature
to be performed by trial judges.
164

165
166
167
168
169
170
171

Burlington N. R.R. v. Dep’t of Pub. Serv. Regulation, 763 F.2d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 1985)
(“The Supreme Court has been ambivalent on whether changed circumstances can transform a once-rational statute into an irrational law.”); Murillo v. Bambrick, 681 F.2d 898,
912 n.27 (3d Cir. 1982) (“[T]he Supreme Court appears not to have determined definitively whether changed conditions are a relevant consideration in equal protection analysis.”); Lerner v. Corbett, 972 F. Supp. 2d 676, 682 (M.D. Pa. 2013) (“As a general manner,
it is unclear whether consideration of changed circumstances is appropriate to an equal
protection inquiry.”); Jones v. Schneiderman, 888 F. Supp. 2d 421, 425–26 (S.D.N.Y.
2012) (“[T]he Second Circuit has not expressly embraced the view that changed circumstances may be considered as part of a rational basis review.”).
Several state supreme courts have explicitly recognized contemporary contextual
analysis when conducting rational basis review under the equal protection clauses of their
respective state constitutions. See, e.g., Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894,
913 (Fla. 2014) (“Conditions can change, which remove or negate the justification for a
law, transforming what may have once been reasonable into arbitrary and irrational legislation.”); Ferdon ex rel. Pertucelli v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440, 468 (Wis.
2005) (“A statute may be constitutionally valid when enacted but may become constitutionally invalid because of changes in the conditions to which the statute applies. A past
crisis does not forever render a law valid.” (footnotes omitted)). This Comment does
engage in an in-depth discussion of the foregoing state court authority because those decisions did not implicate the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Additionally, while those state courts did accept contemporary contextual analysis, they did not
engage in a more elaborate discussion of its benefits.
Burlington, 763 F.2d at 1111; Murillo, 681 F.2d at 912.
Murillo, 681 F.2d at 911–12; see Burlington, 763 F.2d at 1111.
Murillo, 681 F.2d at 900.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 906–07.
Id. at 907.
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established the no-fault divorce, eliminating the requirement that a
172
Despite the no-fault reforms, the
plaintiff prove a marital wrong.
legislature made no corresponding change to the additional fees lev173
ied on matrimonial actions.
The Murillo plaintiffs argued that the collection of the special fees
for matrimonial actions lost its rational relationship to a legitimate
174
governmental interest after the adoption of no-fault divorce. They
asserted that, following this reform, the legislature could not rationally believe that divorce proceedings would continue to exert a greater
175
burden on the judicial system than other civil actions.
The Third Circuit disagreed with this argument and held that the
special fees passed rational basis review even after the establishment
176
of no-fault divorce. The court identified two potential rational bases relating the fees to the state’s legitimate interest in maintaining its
177
judiciary. First, the legislature could rationally believe that divorcerelated litigation would continue to impose an additional financial
178
burden on the courts. Second, the legislature could rationally believe that the increasing costs of civil litigation as a whole justified the
recovery of additional funds and that matrimonial actions offered an
appropriate starting point because litigants already expected to pay
179
special fees. The court concluded that, under rational basis review,
the legislature held no duty to support its beliefs with empirical evi180
dence.
The Third Circuit’s conclusions concerning the rationality of the
special fees present no threat to contemporary contextual analysis.
In fact, those conclusions fit quite comfortably within the deferent
nature of rational basis review.
However, the court continued its discussion and questioned
whether it was appropriate to consider changed factual conditions.
The Third Circuit noted, “[T]he Supreme Court appears not to have
determined definitively whether changed conditions are a relevant
181
consideration in equal protection analysis.” The court further stat172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181

Id.
Id.
Id. at 907–08.
Id.
Id. at 908.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 909–10.
Id. at 912 n.27 (identifying the conflicting statements in Clover Leaf Creamery and Carolene
Products).
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ed that considering changed conditions “impose[s] an unwarranted
obligation upon legislative bodies: the obligation constantly to reassess the continuing validity of the factual premises underlying each
182
The court explained
piece of legislation enacted over the years.”
that the Constitution “neither demands nor expects” legislatures to
183
Finally,
exercise “omniscient oversight” once its laws take effect.
the court reasoned that it should only strike down a rationally enacted classification “when a statute, rendered manifestly unreasonable
by changed conditions, remains in effect for many years without legis184
lative action.”
In Burlington Northern Railroad v. Department of Public Service Regulation, the Ninth Circuit confronted the issue of changed factual condi185
tions and responded with the same concerns as the Murillo court.
There, the plaintiff, a railroad company, challenged a Montana statute and regulation that required railroads to maintain and staff sta186
tion facilities in towns with a population of at least 1000 people.
Moreover, Montana law did not impose similar demands on other
187
The plaintiff argued that changed conditions
common carriers.
rendered this requirement irrational under the Equal Protection
188
In the sixteen years since the statute’s 1969 enactment,
Clause.
centralized, computerized service centers took over many of the du189
ties performed by station agents. Also, freight traffic from the small
190
stations declined significantly in that same time period.
The Ninth Circuit first identified the legislature’s legitimate governmental interest as serving “the public convenience and necessi191
ty.” The court then concluded that the legislature could rationally
believe that railroads are a special class of common carrier, providing
a vital form of transportation, and that requiring station facilities in
small communities would ensure a minimal level of service for the
192
Even considering the plaintiff’s evidence that the
state’s citizens.
railroad industry had undergone substantial changes, the court found

182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192

Id. at 911.
Id.
Id. at 912.
Burlington N. R.R. v. Dep’t of Pub. Serv. Regulation, 763 F.2d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 1985).
Id. at 1108–09.
Id. at 1113.
Id. at 1111, 1113–14.
Id. at 1109.
Id.
Id. at 1109–10.
Id. at 1110, 1113–14.
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that those changes were not so drastic as to transform the legislature’s
193
assumptions from rational to irrational.
Similar to the Third Circuit’s reasoning in Murillo, the Ninth Circuit’s basic conclusions under rational basis review do not conflict
with contemporary contextual analysis. The Ninth Circuit did consider the plaintiff’s evidence of changed factual conditions, but that
evidence failed to demonstrate that requiring station facilities in
194
small towns had become irrational.
Even so, the Ninth Circuit voiced its concerns about assessing classifications based on changed conditions. The court stated, “The Supreme Court has been ambivalent on whether changed circumstanc195
es can transform a once-rational statute into an irrational law.” The
court then explained that the time of the classification’s creation is
the proper point of reference in rational basis review:
In construing statutory language, a court must ordinarily consider the
circumstances at the time of passage, rather than later interpretations or
statements of purpose. Where courts have invalidated archaic statutes,
there is often an independent constitutional basis for doing so (i.e., a be196
lated recognition that the statutes were unconstitutional as written).

The Murillo and Burlington courts’ dismissals of contemporary
contextual analysis rely on common arguments about the institutional competence of the legislature and judiciary, but such dismissals are
unwarranted. The argument that contemporary contextual analysis
will place an extreme burden on legislative bodies assumes that the
duty to maintain a system of constitutional laws—laws not based on
outmoded factual premises—falls almost entirely to legislatures. Of
course, people who believe that a particular law has become irrational should complain to their legislative representatives. Because those
representatives are politically accountable, the legislature may respond to the people’s concerns. But attempting to update the law
through the legislative process is a complex and time-consuming en197
deavor. Even if claims that a law has become irrational are meritorious, the legislature may view the problem as too insignificant to jus198
tify taking corrective action. Business that the legislature considers
199
more important may also stifle such a remedy.

193
194
195
196
197
198
199

Id. at 1111.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1111 n.3 (citations omitted).
See Bice, supra note 48, at 35–36.
Id. at 36.
Id.
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In light of the legislature’s limited responsiveness, courts provide
the best forum to evaluate the continuing rationality of laws. First,
people may not realize that a particular classification applies to them
until an enforcement action is brought before a court, precluding
200
Second, courts
their ability to lobby the legislature for a change.
are skilled empirical fact-finders. The judiciary’s broad discovery
tools allow it to gain access to a vast amount of relevant infor201
mation, and the adversarial process ensures the zealous presentation of arguments on each side.
If courts refuse to consider changed factual conditions, analyzing
the rationality of classifications only at the time of creation, they will
rarely find that classifications are based on implausible assumptions
202
This focus on the
unless the legislature made a “clear mistake.”
point of creation turns the already deferent rational basis review into
a toothless inquiry. The judiciary’s failure to conduct a meaningful
assessment of the constitutionality of classifications threatens its own
legitimacy and the legitimacy of legislative bodies.
When courts review classifications for their rational bases, they are
asking whether the state’s actions adhere to the minimum requirements of the Constitution. Rational basis review often validates even
those classifications that are unwise or improvident on the assumption that the political process will rectify them, but there is an important distinction between classifications that are merely unwise and
203
Though unwise classificaclassifications that are unconstitutional.
tions may be politically unpopular, a legislature is empowered to create them. On the other hand, a legislature lacks any power to create
unconstitutional classifications. By allowing classifications that are irrational in the current factual context to remain in effect, courts abdicate their role as monitors of constitutional compliance. The public may then question the legitimacy or competence of a judiciary that
permits the power of the legislature to swell beyond its constitutional
bounds.
200
201
202
203

Id. at 35–36.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26–37 (outlining the information-gathering tools available in the discovery process).
See Bice, supra note 48, at 35.
See Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979) (“The Constitution presumes that, absent
some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by
the democratic process and that judicial intervention is generally unwarranted no matter
how unwisely we may think a political branch has acted. Thus, we will not overturn a
statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the
achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that
the legislature’s actions were irrational.” (footnotes omitted)).
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Additionally, the courts’ neglect of contemporary contextual analysis could foster resentment of the legislature. If burdened by classifications that make no rational sense in the present context, the public may direct its disdain for those classifications toward their creator.
The legislature might be viewed as an unrestrained institution, expanding its own power without check.
The Supreme Court should clarify that contemporary contextual
analysis is a necessary part of rational basis review under the Equal
Protection Clause. The Court’s precedent supports the conclusion
that previously rational classifications can become irrational as factual
conditions change. Also, the judiciary holds the proper tools and experience to examine the changed factual conditions, and by conducting such examinations, it promotes the stability and visibility of constitutional restraints on government power.

CONCLUSION

Contemporary contextual analysis is an integral part of the Equal
Protection Clause. Each level of scrutiny requires that courts examine the factual conditions surrounding a classification at the time of
the constitutional challenge, rather than the time of the classification’s creation. Though contemporary contextual analysis may lead
to once-constitutional laws later being declared unconstitutional, it
can be reconciled with the conventional view that constitutional decisions are permanent because no manipulation of operative propositions or decisional rules is necessary.
While the Supreme Court has used contemporary contextual
analysis consistently in strict scrutiny, lower courts debate the applicability of such analysis in rational basis review. This debate must
be resolved in favor of contemporary contextual analysis. First, the
Court’s precedent indicates that the rationality of laws can be affected by subsequent facts. Second, courts possess the tools and experience to engage in complex empirical fact-finding. Third, contemporary contextual analysis promotes the legitimacy of the judiciary and
other government institutions.

